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STALLMAN V. YOUNGQUIST:* PARENT-CHILD
TORT IMMUNITY: WILL ILLINOIS EVER GIVE
THIS DOCTRINE THE EXAMINATION AND
ANALYSIS IT DESERVES?
The Illinois parent-child tort immunity doctrine' has traditionally prohibited 2 or severely obstructed the rights of children seeking
recovery for injuries suffered at the hands of their parents.' A substantial number of other jurisdictions do not recognize parent-child
immunity, finding the doctrine itself outdated,' and its supporting
*

129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).

1. The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity does not allow a child to sue a
parent or a parent to sue a child for personal injuries resulting from intentional torts
or negligence. See W. PROSSER, W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 at 905 (5th ed.
1984). As the doctrine now exists in Illinois, however, either a parent or child may
maintain an action for injuries resulting from intentional torts or willful and wanton
misconduct. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956). Recent Illinois
appellate court decisions have also created a number of exceptions to the doctrine
which allow parent-child negligence lawsuits in a variety fo circumstances. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 863-65, 473 N.E.2d 400, 403-04 (1984); See
also Hartigan v. Berry, 128 Ill. App. 3d 195, 199, 470 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1984) (allows
third party to bring action seeking contribution from parents alleging negligence of
parents contributed to the child's injury); Moon v. Thompson, 127 II. App. 3d 657,
662, 469 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (same); Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72,
372 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (1978) (allows child to maintain action against parent for negligence when duty violated is statutory rather than common law); Busillo v. Hetzel,
58 Ill. App. 3d 685, 374 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (19789 (allows child to maintain action
against grandparent standing in loco parentis); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 51 Il1. App. 3d
972, 975, 367 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1977) (same); Johnson v. Meyers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844,
846, 277 N.e.2d 778, 779 (1972) (allows child to maintain action against estate of deceased parent); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968)
(allows child to maintain action against parent when tortious conduct has no direct
relationship to the family purpose).
2. The first two Illinois cases addressing the issue of parent-child tort immunity
held that a child was absolutely barred from maintaining an action in tort against a
parent. See Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164, 169 (1933) ("[i]t is a rule
of common law that a child cannot sue his father in tort unless a right of action is
authorized by statute"); Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577, 580 (1895) ("lilt is doubtless
the law that a child can not [sic] maintain an action for damages on account of maltreatment against a parent..
").
3. Presently, children seeking recovery for injuries inflicted by their parents are
not absolutely barred from bringing an action, but have the burden of demonstrating
that the tortious activity complained of encompasses one of the exceptions the courts
have created to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust
Co. v. Turner, 83 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237-38, 403 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (1980); See also
Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403; Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d
104, 105-07, 435 N.E.2d 770, 771 (1982); Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72,
372 N.E.2d 1127, 1130 (1978) (Webber, J., dissenting); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill.
App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968).
4. Twenty jurisdictions now recognize no form of parent-child tort immunity.
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public policy arguments unpersuasive in light of social and jurisprudential developments since its inception.8 Illinois courts have persistently upheld parent-child tort immunity, although a number of
exceptions and modifications of the doctrine have developed. 6 The
Hebel v. Hebei, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d
282 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. (1971); Peterson v. City and County of Honolulu, 53 Hawaii 440, 496 P.2d 4 (1972); Tamashiro v.
DeGama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758,
611 P.2d 135 (1980); Ridgon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mch.
234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972);
Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Romanik v. Toro Co., 277 N.W.2d
515 (Minn. 1979); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Baits v.
Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Vickers v. Vickers, 109 N.H. 69, 242 A.2d
57 (1968); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 430, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman,
23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); Pierce v. Helz, 64 Misc. 2d
131, 314 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1971); Howell v. Perri, 304 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364
(N.D. 1967); Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388 (1985); Kirchner v.
Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984); Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681
P.2d 776 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275
S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971);
Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1976); Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141,
191 N.W.2d 872 (1971); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Eight other jurisdictions do not recognize parent-child tort immunity if the tort
arises out of the operation of a motor vehicle. Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d
783 (1972); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634
(Me. 1979); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Gueterman
v. Guterman, 66 N.J. 69, 328 A.2d 233 (1974); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J.
500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Ledwell v. Berry, 39 N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978),
cert. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E.2d 35 (1979); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 182
S.E.2d 190 (1971); Lee v. Comer, 159 W. Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976). See also
CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN.

§ 52-572C (West 1985), N.C.

GEN. STAT. §

1-539.21 (1983)

(statutory abrogation of parent-child tort immunity for injuries resulting from negligent operation of a motor vehicle).
5. See, e.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 766, 611 P.2d 135, 140
(1980) ("[w]e believe that the authorities which favor abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine state the proper approach in light of modern conditions and conceptions of public policy"); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 368, 150 A.2d 905, 909 (1930)
("[m]ere legal technicalities or remote possibilities of fact are not sufficient. Public
policy is not or at least ought not to be enforced on any such basis"); Shearer v.
Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 95, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1985) ("[i]f the doctrine of parental immunity as posited were a good and useful rule of law, we could reasonably
presume that the experience of the law would empirically establish the wisdom of
that doctrine. . . [t]hat has not happened"); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326,
327, 474 N.E.2d 275, 277 (1984) ("[wle find these rationalizations underlying the doctrine of parental immunity to be outdated, highly questionable and unpersuasive.").
6. The Supreme Court of Illinois has only specifically addressed the issue of
parent-child tort immunity on two occasions. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d
451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1966); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
On each occasion the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the doctrine of parentchild tort immunity did not apply in cases where the tortious conduct was willful and
wanton. Mroczynski, 34 Il1. 2d at 455, 126 N.e.2d at 139; Nudd, 7 11. 2d at 619, 131
N.E.2d at 531. This exception to parent-child tort immunity opened the doors for
Illinois appellate courts to recognize a myriad of other exceptions. See e.g., Stallman,
129 I1. App. 3d at 863-65, 473 N.E.2d at 403-04, citing, Hartigan v. Beery, 128 Il.
App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 571 (1984); Cummings v. Jackson, 57 II. App. 3d 68, 372
N.E.2d 1127 91978); Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill. app. 3d 682, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (1978);
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Stallman v. Youngquist

Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District recently assessed
the vitality of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in StaUman
v. YoungquistJ Noting the doctrine's sound and solid foundation,8
the court held that the doctrine remained a viable aspect of Illinois
law. The court further held, however, that due to recent modifications and longstanding exceptions, the doctrine may not absolutely
bar a child's action against a parent.9
On October 7, 1981, Bari Stallman, five months pregnant with
Lindsay Stallman, drove her automobile along a highway in Illinois.10 While entering the driveway of a restaurant, the defendantmother's automobile collided with the automobile of the defendant,
Clarence Youngquist.1' As a result of the collision the plaintiff was
born prematurely with serious intestinal injuries.1"
An action was subsequently brought on behalf of the plaintiffchild' 8s seeking damages for internal injuries allegedly resulting from
the collision. Count II of the complaint alleged that the defendantmother was negligent in the operation of her automobile"1 and that
such negligence resulted in serious injury to the plaintiff." The circuit court dismissed the negligence count against the defendantmother," finding that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
7
barred the plaintiffs action.'
Reversing the circuit court's dismissal, the Appellate Court of
Illinois for the First District addressed the issue of whether the parent-child tort immunity doctrine absolutely barred the plaintiffchild's cause of action.'" While determining that the parent-child
tort immunity doctrine remained an integral part of Illinois tort
law,1 9 the court, nonetheless held that the doctrine does not bar reGulledge v. Gulledge, 51111. App. 3d 972, 367 N.e.2d 429 (1977); Johnson v. Meyers, 2
Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Iln. App. 2d 199, 241
N.E.2d 12 (1968).
7. Stallman, 129 Ill App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).
8. Id. at 863, 473 N.E.2d at 403, citing Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199,
241 N.E.2d 12 (1986).
9. Staliman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 402-03. See also supra notes
1 & 3.
10. Brief of Appellant at 1, Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 860,
473 N.E.2d 400, 401 (1984).
11. 129 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 473 N.E.2d at 40. The plaintiff also brought a negli-

gence count against Clarence Youngquist. That action was not dismissed. Stallman v.
Youngquist, No. 82 L 16571 is presently pending in the Circuit court of Cook County,
Illinois, County Department, Law Division.
12. Brief of Appellant at 2; Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 860, 473 N.E.2d at 400.

13. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 860, 473 N.E.2d at 400.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Brief of Appellant at 1.
16. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 473 N.E.2d at 401.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 859, 473 N.E.2d at 400.
19. Id. at 865, 473 N.E.2d at 404.
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covery for injuries arising out of activities that are outside the family purpose or are unrelated to the family relationship.2" Applying
these exceptions, the court held that the plaintiff-child was allowed
to prove that the parental activity was outside the scope of the family purpose and remanded the case for further proceedings.2
The court initially determined that Lindsay Stallman, although
still a fetus at the time of her mother's alleged negligence, was a
legal person for the limited purpose of maintaining a negligence suit
after her birth.22 After making this determination, the court briefly
outlined the origin of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine in Illinois"8 and found that precedent and public policy considerations
provided the doctrine with a sufficient base in Illinois law.2'
Analyzing the present state of parent-child immunity, the court
recognized the national trend in favor of abrogation of the doctrine 5
and further conceded that the potency of parent-child immunity
had weakened in Illinois.2' The Stallman court, however, relied
upon an earlier decision2 7 and held that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine continued to bar a child's recovery for injuries resulting from conduct directly connected to or in furtherance of the family purpose.' 8
20. Id. at 863, 473 N.E.2d at 403.
21. Id. at 865, 473 N.E.2d at 404.
22. Id. at 862, 473 N.E.2d at 402. The Supreme Court of Illinois has determined
that an infant has a right to be born free from negligently inflicted prenatal injuries.
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977). The
Supreme Court of Illinois has further rejected the requirement that a fetus be "viable" at the time of injury. The court allowed an infant's claim seeking damages for a
negligent preconception blood transfusion to the child's mother which allegedly
caused permanent injury to the infant. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
The scope of this casenote does not concern itself with the issue of prenatal injuries, or the duties of others to an unborn child. For an overview of Illinois law in this
area see Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 11. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1970). For a
general overview of the law in this area see Annot., 91 A.L.R. 3D 316 (1979). For a
scholarly discussion of the duty a mother owes to her unborn child see Beal, Can I
Sue Mommy? An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for PrenatalInjuries to Her
Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325 (1984).
23. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 473 N.E.2d at 402. The court recognized
that the doctrine was instituted in Illinois in the case of Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App.
577, 580 (1895) ("[iut is doubtless the law, that a child can not [sic] maintain an
action for damages on account of maltreatment against a parent

. .

. "). The Stall-

man court, however, does not explicitly recognize that the Foley decision, adopting
parent-child tort immunity, is not supported by any prior caselaw. Compare
Stalman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 473 N.E.2d at 402 with Foley, 61 Ill. App. at 580-83.
24. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 863, 473 N.E.2d at 403, citing Schenk v.
Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968) ("the immunity doctrine is
neither unjust, unreasonable nor without a sound and solid foundation").
25. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 473 N.E.2d at 402.
26. Id.
27. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968) relied upon in
Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 863-64, 473 N.E.2d at 402-03.
28. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403.
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Because the action had been dismissed at the trial court level
without an inquiry into the facts," the appellate court was without
power to apply its holding to the facts.3 0 The Stailman court, therefore, remanded the case to allow the plaintiff-child an opportunity
to prove that her mother's alleged negligent conduct was entirely
unrelated to the objectives and purposes of the family."1 Absent
such proof, the parent-child tort immunity doctrine would bar her
action. 2
The decision of the Stallman court is deficient because it fails
to recognize that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine serves no
valuable purpose in modern society. Analysis of the doctrine's controversarial history should have led the court to conclude that the
doctrine's very existence in Illinois law is questionable.8 s Parentchild tort immunity relies upon public policy arguments with little
or no validity in present day society. 4 Rather than conducting an
analysis which recognizes the changing roles of families in 1981, the
court instead chose to base its decision upon a string of prior Illinois
decisions. Each of those decisions, regardless of their outcome, support the validity of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. 5 As a
29. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff-child's negligence count against the
defendant-mother without regard for the fact that the plaintiff in her pleadings, alleged that the defendant-mother's conduct was outside the scope of the family relationship. See Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 401.
30. The court obviously recognized that in reviewing a motion to dismiss, all
well pleaded facts are to be assumed true, and the reviewing court must not make
determinations of factual questions. See generally Holland v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
127 Ill. App. 3d 854, 469 N.E.2d 419 (1984); McCormick v. McCormick, 118 Ill. App.
3d 455, 455 N.E.2d 103 (1983).
31. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403 ("plaintiff should be
given the opportunity to prove whether defendant Stallman's act of driving to a restaurant was not an act arising out of the family relationship, and directly connected
with family purposes and objectives").
32. Stallman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403. See also Schenk v.
Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968) (father's action against 17
year old unemancipated daughter barred by parent-child tort immunity doctrine absent proof that daughter's conduct was outside the scope of the family relationship).
33. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of the history of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine
see infra notes 36-56 and accompanying text. See also McCurdy, Tort Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1078-83 (1930).
35. The court relied upon a string of Illinois appellate court cases decided between 1895 and 1984. Each decision recognizes the doctrine's existence, yet some decisions allow exceptions to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. The doctrine has
barred actions: by a child against a parent for injuries caused while driving the child
home from work, Wilkosz v. Wilkosz, 124 Il1.App. 3d 904, 464 N.E.2d 1232 (1984); by
a child against a parent for negligence while driving the child to piano lessons, Hogan
v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d 770 (1982); by a parent against a child for
negligence while driving to a college campus, Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 Ill. App. 3d 799, 404
N.E.2d 349 (1980); by a child against a parent for negligent driving where the child
failed to specifically allege that the parent's conduct was outside the scope of family
activity, Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 Ill. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d
1256 (1980); by a child against a parent for negligently permitting a loose stairway
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result of the apparent "well settled" quality of precedent in this
area, the Stallman court failed to question the doctrine's existence.
A brief history of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine demonstrates that the Stalman court's reliance upon Illinois precedent

is misplaced.86 At common law, children were allowed to assert both
contract and property actions against their parents.8 7 This right continues to exist in Illinois as well as other jurisdictions. 8 While the

decisions which first adopted parent-child tort immunity at the turn
of this century claim strong common law precedent for their decirug in the family home, Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Heap, 128 Ill. App. 2d
165, 262 N.E.2d 826 (1970); and an action by a child against a child for assault and
battery, Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895).
Illinois courts have allowed actions: where a third party action was brought
against the parent for negligent supervision of the child, Hartigan v. Beery, 128 Ill.
App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 571 (1984); where a third party action was brought against
the parent alleging that the parent's negligence contributed to the child's injuries,
Moon v. Thompson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 657, 469 N.E.2d 365 (1984); Larson v.
Buschkamp, 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982); where a child brought a
negligence action against a parent alleging violation of a statutory duty, Cummings v.
Jackson, 57 II. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978); where a child brought an action
to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of a grandparent, Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 682, 374 N.E.2d 429 (1977); where a child brought an action
against a deceased parent, Johnson v. Meyers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 884, 277 N.E.2d 778
(1972); and where a child brought an action against a parent where the alleged negligent conduct had no direct relationship with the family purpose, Schenk v. Schenk,
100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968).
36. The first case recognizing parent-child tort immunity was Hewelette v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). That case involved an action by a child against
her mother for false imprisonment. The daughter was married but separated from her
husband. The mother had the daughter committed to an asylum. In addressing the
issue as to whether the daughter should be allowed to maintain an action against her
mother, yet without citing authority, the court reasoned:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public
policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of
society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a
claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
The State, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from
parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to
demand.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
During the development of the doctrine, however, many courts ignored or disregarded parent-child tort immunity. See, eg., Treschman v. Treschman, 61 N.E. 961
(Ind. App. 1901) (allowing child to maintain suit against mother for battery); Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) (allowing child to maintain action against
parent for negligence). See also McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. Rev. 1030, 1079-80 (1930).
37. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 353, 150 A. 905, 906 (1930); Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.E.2d 193, 197 (1963). See also COOLEY, LAW OF
ToRTs 197 (1984); Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 497 (1982); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1079 (1930).

38. See, Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Schenk
v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 204, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968); Varap v. Varap, 76 Ill.
App. 2d 402, 404, 222 N.E.2d 77, 79 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122
N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963). See also W. PROSSE.R, W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 122
at 906 (5th ed. 1984).
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sions,3s the weight of nineteenth century authority actually indicates
a willingness to allow children to bring actions against their parents
for both negligent and intentional torts.4 °
In 1895, despite this contrary authority, the Appellate Court of
Illinois for the Second District, citing no authority, adopted the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. 41 The rationale supporting Illinois'
39. Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577, 580 (1895) ("lilt is doubtless the law that a
child can not [sic] maintain and action . . . "); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703,

711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891) ("a sound public policy designed to subserve the repose of
families and the best interests of society forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court in assertion of a claim to civil redress ....
); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 388-90, 77 S.W. 664, 664 (1903) ("[alt common law... the child had no
civil remedy against the father for personal injuries ....
); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 247, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905) ("[tlhere being no authority at common law for
such an action, and it being claimed that there is any statutory provision for an action of this kind, [civil redress for battery-father's rape of his minor daughter] we
are of the opinion that the action should not have been entertained ....
).
40. See Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 510-12, 7 A. 273, 275 (1886) (school
teacher may be held liable for damages resulting from excessive punishment); Nelson
v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 183, 24 N.W. 730, 731 (1885) (guardian of a young female
ware held liable for money damages in an action for negligently sending ward from
his home without proper clothing, resulting in frostbite to the ward); Johnson and
Wife v. State, 21 Tenn. 291 (2 Humph 283, 283) (1837) appended to Saunders &
Martin v. Turbeville, 21 Tenn. 280 (2 Humph. 272) (1840) ("[in chastising a child,
the parent must be careful that he does not exceed the bounds of moderation and
inflict cruel and merciless punishment; if he do, [sic] he is a trespasser..."); Lander
v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 123-24 (1859) (school teacher standing in loco parentis or a
parent will be held liable for punishment to child that is unreasonably severe and
inflicted by wicked motives). But see Gould v. Christianson, 10 Fed. Cas. 857, 864
(S.D.N.Y. 1836) (No. 5,636), where the court stated that:
A master of a vessel, under the imputed authority of a parent over his crew, or
even over mere boys under his charge, cannot claim the exemption or immunity which a father enjoys, to chastise a child at his discretion, without responsibility to the law, by punishments, other than such as are cruel and injurious
to the life of health of the child ....
Id.
41. Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577, 578-80 (1895). In Foley, the plaintiff-child
brought an action against his uncle, the child's adopted father, for battery, and neglect to furnish medical care after the child's arm had been broken by a vicious horse.
At trial the jury was instructed:
1. The court instructs the jury that if a parent, or one sustaining that relation
to a child, treats that child inhumanly or cruelly, so as to injure it in health or
limb, the parents are subject to criminal prosecution, and conviction punished
by fine or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years.
But a child can not [sic] maintain a civil action for damages against its parents
for such injury. This rule of law, as the court conceives, is founded upon consideration of public policy, affecting family government; that is, that the child
shall not contest with the parent the parent's right to govern the child.
Id. at 579.
Approving of the foregoing jury instruction, which resulted in a verdict in favor
of the defendant, the Foley court stated:
It is doubtless the law, that a child can not [sic] maintain an action for damages on account of maltreatment against a parent whether the relation is by
blood, or created by adoption, under the Statute, followed by all the legal consequences, and incidents of the natural relation.
Id. at 580.
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adoption of parent-child immunity was an apparent public policy
favoring the rights of parents to maintain authority within the family. 4 2 Other jurisdictions compared the parent-child relationship to
that of husband and wife, noting the long standing common law immunity between husbands and wives. 8 On the other hand, some
courts resisted or ignored the development of parent-child tort im8
munity4 ' which had come to produce some rather harsh results.'
The doctrine continued to gain support, however, and eventually

was adopted in all but eight jurisdictions."6
Throughout its development, other jurisdictions have adopted
numerous justifications for the doctrine.' Illinois, however, has con42. Foley v. Foley, 61 Il. App. 577, 579-80 (1895). See supra note 41.
43. See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 391, 77 S.W. 664, 665 (1903). This view, however, has been
harshly criticized. The legal relationship between husband and wife has never existed
between parents and children. At common law their existed a legal unity between
husband and wife. The legal existence of the wife was absorbed into the husband.
The unity does not exist in the relationship between children and their parents. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 353-54, 150 A. 905, 906 (1930). See also Hollister, ParentChild Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification,50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 496
(1982); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1030, 1057 (1930).
44. Resisting the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 A. 905, 906-08 (1930)
stated:
There has never been a common-law rule that a child could not sue its parent.
It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with that idea, and treat the
suits which have been allowed as exceptions to a general rule. The minor has
the same right to redress for wrongs as any other individual.
Id.
Dunlap allowed a child's action against his father for injuries sustained as a result of the father's negligence while working with the father's construction company.
See also Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 292-94, 95 N.W. 640, 641 (1903) (without mention of parent-child ihmunity allowed a child's action against guardian for negligently causing the child to leave the family home without sufficient clothing causing
the child to become frostbitten).
45. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 363-64, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930). See, e.g.,
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 247, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905). The court disallowed child's
action for damages resulting from the father's rape fo the child. Id. The court's rationale was that to allow children to sue their parents would disrupt family harmony.
Id.
46. Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 494 n.39 (1982), noting that parent-child tort immunity was
never adopted in Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah or Vermont; further noting that Montana has recognized husband-wife immunity, but has
never specifically recognized parent-child tort immunity.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho indicated that Idaho has never
adopted intrafamily immunities. See Farmers Insurance Group v. Reed, No. 14421
(Idaho, June 17, 1985) (available September 5, 1985 on WESTLW, States Library)
("[c]ontrary to a widespread assumption, the general doctrine of intrafamily immunity has never been incorporated into Idaho common law").
47. The following general policy considerations have been adopted to support
the validity of parent-child tort immunity:
1. Preservation of family harmony and domestice tranquility.
2. Preservation of parental authority.
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sistently relied upon public policy promoting harmony and tranquility within the family as its support for the doctrine's continued validity.4' The rationale for this argument is that the prevention of
intrafamily litigation will protect and support family harmony.'
The Illinois Supreme Court has, in dicta, questioned the propriety of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine on several occasions, 50 but to date has never specifically decided whether a parent
is liable for injuries inflicted upon a child absent willful and wanton
conduct.5 1 At the time the supreme court first addressed the issue of
parent-child tort immunity 2 it held that neither stare decisis nor
public policy supporting family harmony were sufficient to bar a
child's recovery for injuries resulting from the willful and wanton
misconduct of a parent. 3 Despite the Illinois Supreme Courts's indi3. The injured child's right to institute criminal proceedings or seek removal from the parents custody.
4. Preservation of family financial security.
5. The analogy between the relationship between husbands and wives to
that of parents and children.
6. The reluctance to allow parental inheritance of the child's recovery.
7. The court's fear of frivolous claims.
8. The danger of fraud or collusion between family members.
See Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325, 335 (1984). See also
Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 761, 611 P.2d 135, 138 (1980).
48. The Illinois decision first adoption parent-child tort immunity relied upon
policy consideration supporting parental authority. See Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App.
577, 579 (1895). Other Illinois decisions upholding parent-child tort immunity, however, rely upon public policy supporting family harmony. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 454, 216 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1966); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 616, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956); Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859,
865, 473 N.E.2d 400, 403-04 (1984); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 111.App. 2d 199, 204, 241
N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968).
49. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 454, 216 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1966);
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 616, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956); Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865, 473 N.E.2d 400, 403-04 (1 984); Schenk v. Schenk, 100
Ill. App. 2d 199, 204, 241 N.e.2d 12, 15 (1968).
50. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 455, 216 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1966)
("[w]hile there might be sufficient justification to prevent suits for mere negligence
[emphasis
.
added]; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 619, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531
(1956) ("any justification for the role of parental immunity can be found only in a
reluctance to create litigation and strife between members of the family unit" [emphasis added]).
51. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bod. of Educ., 63 Il1. 2d 165, 178-79, .347 N.E.2d 705,
712 (1976) (Goldenhersh, Schaefer, and Ward, J., dissenting). But see Thomas v. Chicago Bd, of Educ., 77 Ill. 2d 165, 395 N.E.2d 538 (1970); Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d
47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978).
52. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
53. Id. at 617-19, 131 N.E.2d at 530-31. In Nudd, the plaintiff-child alleged in
the complaint that the defendant-father "willfully recklessly and wantonly drove his
vehicle at an excessive rate of speed on a foggy nigh, when travelling was difficult
because of the wet pavement. . . " Id. at 610, 131 N.E.2d at 526. The Supreme Court
of Illinois reversed the dismissal of the trial court, holding that the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine did not bar an action for injuries caused by willful and wanton
misconduct. Id. at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
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cation that parent-child immunity is not "well settled" in Illinois,'
and despite that Court's indications that this area of the law war-

rants review,' 5 the Stailman court neglected to undertake any such
review."
The Stallman court cited as authority no less than fourteen Illinois appellate court decisions,' 7 each of which fails to examine the

doctrine's present validity. Instead, these decisions relied on both
the policy argument that the doctrine promotes family harmony and

earlier precedent that has gone unexamined since Illinois first
adopted parent-child tort immunity." Paradoxically, however, the

Stallman court plainly admits that the doctrine is court-created and
that the courts are free to alter any doctrine which they create." If
the Stallman court had reviewed the questionable rationale sup-

porting the existence of Illinois' parent-child tort immunity doctrine, rather than hide behind the skirts of stare decisis, it would
have significantly altered the doctrine.
One method to alter the doctrine is to abolish it. Analysis of the
policy argument upon which the Stallman court relies demonstrates
severe weaknesses. Promotion of family harmony and domestic tranquility is a worthy yet idealistic goal for the courts to pursue. Relying on this policy to support the parent-child immunity doctrine,
the Stailman court must have assumed that lawsuits between par-

ents and their children would significantly upset family harmony.
54. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
55. Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Il. 2d 165, 178-79, 347 N.E.2d 705,
712 (1976) (J.J. Goldenhersh, Schaefer, and Ward dissenting); Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34 Ill. 2d 451, 454, 216 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1966); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 616, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1956).
56. See Staliman, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 863-65, 473 N.E.2d at 402-04.
57. Hartigan v. Beer, 128 Ill. App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 571 (1984); Moon v.
Thompson, 127, Ill. App. 3d 657, 469 N.E.2d 365 (1984); Wilkosz v. Wilkosz, 124 Ill.
App. 3d 904, 464 N.E.2d 1232 (1984); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435
N.E.2d 221 (1982); Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 Ill. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349 (1980); Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 Ill. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (1980);
Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 682, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (1978); Cummings v. Jackson,
57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 12127 (1978); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 51111. App. 3d 972,
367 N.E.2d 429 (1977); Johnson v. Meyrs, 2 Ill. App. 3d 884. 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972);
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Heap, 128 Il. App. 2d 165, 262 N.E.2d 826
(1970); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968); Foley v. Foley,
61 Ill. App. 577 (1895).
58. See, eg., Wilkosz v. Wilkosz, 124 Ill. App. 3d 904, 909, 464 N.W.2d 1232,
1238 (1984) (without explanation holding that parent-child tort immunity should remain the accepted-policy in Illinois); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 105-07,
435 N.E.2d 770, 770 (1982) (relying upon public policy for application of parent-child
tort immunity, without analysis of the doctrine's rationale); Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 682, 684-85, 374 N.e.2d 1090, 1091 (1978) (relying upon public policy as justification for parent-child tort immunity).
59. 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864-65, 473 N.E.2d at 404, citing Larson v. Buschkamp,
105 II. App. 3d 965, 967, 435 N.E.2d 221, 223 (1982).
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This assumption is unsubstantiated and speculative 0 because any
disruption within the family is more likely to occur because of the
child's injury rather than the resulting lawsuit."1 Furthermore, liability insurance is so prevalent in modern society that a negligence
suit between parent and child is generally a controversy between the
child and the parent's liability insurance carrier." Under most circumstances, a child's action against a parent will not ensue unless
the parent has purchased liability insurance."
Opponents of this argument assert that allowing intrafamily litigation promotes fraud and collusion among family members.6
While this argument presents a facially valid concern against which
the courts must guard, the possibility of fraud and collusion is a
danger existing with any lawsuit involving insurance proceeds."8 De60. See Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 770, 611 P.2d 135, 141 (1980),
where the court stated:
It should be noted that the states [that have abrogated the doctrine] have followed for many years the rule which we have adopted today, yet there apparently has been no significant disruption in family relationships as grimly predicted by the prophets of doom who insist on the application of parental
immunity . . .
Id.
See also Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St. 3d 94, 96, 480 N.E.2d 388, 389 (1985)
("[s]urely reason and experience requires that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions as to the importance of this ancient rule to the interests of domestic tranquility"); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 327, 474 N.e.2d 275, 276-77 (1984)
(family harmony rationale underlying parent-child tort immunity found "to be outdated, highly questionable and unpersuasive").
61. Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, No. 14421 (Idaho June 17, 1985) (available
September 5, 1985, on WESTLAW, States library) ("[d]isruption of domestic tranquility
is much less likely where the minor child can be compensated for his losses . . .");
Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 328, 474 N.e.2d 275, 277 (1984) ("domestic
tranquility in our opinion will be promoted by our abrogation of this artificial bar to
recovery .... ");Lee v. Comer, 159 W.Va. 585, 587, 224 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1976) ("to
hold that a child's pains must be endured for the pease and welfare of the family is
something of a mockery").
62. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920-21, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
293 (1971) ("we fell that we cannot overlook its practical effect on intrafamily suits");
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963) ("we consider the
wide prevalence of liability insurance in personal injury actions a proper element to
be considered in making the policy decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity .... ").See also Worrell v. Worrel, 174 Va. 11, 21, 4 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1939) ("a
different situation arises where the parent is protected by insurance ... [t]his action
is not unfriendly as between the daughter and the father . . . their interests unite in
favor of her recovery .... ").
63. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970); Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15
Ohio St. 3d 326, 330, 474 N.e.2d 275, 277 (1984). See also Barranco v. Jackson, 690
S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting).
64. See W. PiossEsa, W. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToETs § 122 at 905 (5th ed.
1984); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1984).
65. The Supreme Court Kansas noted in Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan.
758, 768-69, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980):
[T]he possibility of collusion exists to a certain extent in any case. Every day
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spite these possibilities, Illinois law does not prohibit lawsuits between friends, cousins, aunts or uncles."e On the contrary, the Stallman court itself recognized that an exception to the parent-child
tort immunity doctrine allows a child to bring a tort action against a
grandparent. 67 The possibility of fraud and collusion should not be
disregarded; rather, it should be recognized that extensive procedural rights, such as summary judgment proceedings, discovery, and
the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at trial, have been established to guard effectively against that danger in a variety of
circumstances." s
Additionally, several of the exceptions to the parent-child tort
immunity doctrine cited in Stallman render the courts reliance on
the family harmony rationale unconvincing. First, as noted above,
Stallman recognized the exception to Illinois parent-child tort immunity allowing a child to bring an action against a grandparent for
injuries resulting from that grandparent's negligence." This exception is inconsistent with Stallman's purpose of promoting family
harmony. If a lawsuit between parent and child is disruptive of the
family harmony, then so too is a lawsuit between grandparent and
child. In a society where it is not uncommon for both parents to
work, and and equally as common for a child to live with only one
we depend on juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine the
facts and arrive at proper verdicts. Experience has shown that the courts are
quite adequate for this task. In litigation between parent and child, judges and
juries would naturally be mindful of the relationship, and would be even more
on the alert for improper conduct.
Id. See also Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 365, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (1975).
66. The author's research locates no authority in Illinois prohibiting lawsuits
between friends or relatives. The Illinois Guest Statute ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 § 10201 (Smith-Hurd 1985), however, provides that no person riding as a guest in a motor
vehicle shall have a cause of action against the driver of a motor vehicle unless the
accident causing injuries has been caused by the willful and wanton misconduct of
the driver. Id.
67. 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403, citing Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 682, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (1978); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 51 Ill. App. 3d 972, 367
N.E.2d 429 (1977).

68. Dismissing the possibility of fraud and collusion as insufficient to uphold
parent-child tort immunity, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Kirchner v. Crystal, 15
Ohio St. 3d 326, 329, 474 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1984), noted:
Unfortunately, fraud and collusion are always a possibility in any legal action
that is pursued. In these types of situations we depend on our judicial framework to ferret out the ficticious claims from the real ones. Our system is well
equipped with sufficient safeguards which are designed to thwart the opportunity for fraud and collusion. The deterrent effect of a perjury charge, extensive
and detailed pretrial discovery procedures, the opportunity for cross examination, and the availability for summary judgment motions, are but a few examples of the tools available to our judicial system in exposing fraudulent claims
in any type of lawsuit.
Id.
69. 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 473 N.E.2d at 403 citing Bussillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill.
App. 3d 682, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (1978); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 51 111. App. 3d 972, 367
N.E.2d 429 (1977).
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parent, frequently the child's grandparents are in loco parentis. In
many cases the grandparents may also share with the parents both
moral and financial duties attendant to raising a child. Thus, to allow a child to bring an action against a grandparent has equal potential to disrupt family harmony.
The Stailman court cites with approval another exception to
parent-child tort immunity: the right of third parties to seek contribution from the parents of an injured child. The court recognized
that Illinois allows a third party to interplead a child's parents as
third party defendants and allege that the negligence of the parent
or parents contributed to the child's injuries. 70 The contribution action is also available in Illinois when the third party alleges that the
parents were negligent in their supervision of the child.7 1 Such actions clearly contradict the purpose of the doctrine itself." When a
contribution action exists, the child's original lawsuit eventually results in the action against the parent. Under these circumstances, a
child is allowed to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence
of both the third party and the parents. Yet when no such third
party action exists the negligent parent is allowed to escape liability.
A majority of jurisdictions that once recognized parent-child
tort immunity now recognize that the doctrine creates many incurable inconsistencies. 783 Finding its supporting policy arguments unpersuasive and its precedent obsolete, these jurisdictions have abrogated the doctrine.7 4 These courts have instead decided that the
plaintiff-child's right to recover for tortiously inflicted injuries overrides the archaic policy arguments supporting a bar to such recovery. 75 Extensively examining the common law background of the
doctrine, the courts that have abrogated parent-child tort immunity
have found no legitimate basis for the doctrine's initial creation.7s
The Staliman court was afforded the opportunity to review the
present validity of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. Unfor70. 129 Ill. App. 3d at 864-65, 473 N.E.2d at 403-04, citing Moon v. Thompson,
127 Il1.App. 3d 657, 469 N.E.2d 365 (1984); Larson v. Buschkamp, 105 111.App. 3d
965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982).
71. 129 Ill. App. 3d at 865, 473 N.E.2d at 404, citing Hartigan v. Beery, 1 28 Ill.
App. 3d 195, 470 N.E.2d 571 (1984).
72. The purpose of the doctrine is clearly to promote family harmony and prevent intrafamily litigation. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il1.2d 608, 619, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531
(1956); Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 105-07, 435 N.E.2d 770, 771 (1982);
Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Il. App. 3d 199, 204, 241 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1968). Obviously, to
allow any intrafamily litigation subverts Illinois' purpose in perpetuating the doctrine. See Cummings v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72-73, 372 N.E.2d 1127, 130
(1978) (Webber, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
73. See supra notes 4 & 5, and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 4 & 5, and accompanying text.

75. See supra notes 60-62.
76. See supra notes 5 & 36-40, and accompanying text.
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tunately, the court did not recognize that the Illinois parent-child
tort immunity doctrine is not as well settled as the caselaw's progeny indicates. A careful analysis of the doctrine should have led the
court to the conclusion that parent-child tort immunity doctrine
causes inconsistent results. Recognition of these inconsistencies has
caused other jurisdictions to revise or abrogate the doctrine. The
StaUman court should have done the same. Because the parentchild tort immunity doctrine serves no legitimate purpose in modern
society, the Illinois judiciary must recognize its uselessness and open
the courts to the state's children.
Timothy I. McArdle

